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WASTING TIME IN CYBERSPACE:
THE UDRP'S INEFFICIENT APPROACH TOWARD
ARBITRATING INTERNET DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES
Chad D. Emersont
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1999, a new option for resolving Internet domain name disputes
was introduced with promises of reducing the time and expense incurred in domain name disputes. 1 Now, as the Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP)2 celebrates its recent anniversary,3
many domain name disputes have not benefited from these promises.
Internet domain names are an increasingly important and valuable
asset for many companies and individuals. 4 So valuable, in fact, that
some domain names have sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars,

t

1.

2.

3.

4.

Chad D. Emerson is an assistant professor of law at Faulkner University's
Thomas Goode Jones School of Law. While working in private practice, he
represented NetLearning, Inc. in the company's litigation against Dan
Parisi. He would like to thank Professors Alex Bolla and Don Garner for
their encouragement, helpful insight, and valuable suggestions in
preparing this article. Professor Emerson also thanks Elizabeth Bern,
Amanda Caves, Kevin Phillips, Tracie Livesay, Norm Templeton, and
Darrel Emerson for their valuable assistance in the researching and editing
of this article.
See The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), The Management
of Internet Names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues, Final Report of the
WIPO Internet Domain Name Process 49 [hereinafter WIPO Final Report], available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/processes/process1/report/doc/report.doc
(Apr. 30, 1999) (last visited February 9, 2005); see also Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31741, 31746 (June 10, 1998)
[hereinafter White Paper].
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"), Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy [hereinafter UDRPj, at http:/ /
www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last updated May 17, 2002). In addition to the UDRP itself, the UDRP contains procedural rules entitled
Rules for the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution. ICANN, Rulesfor
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy [hereinafter Rules], at http:/ /
www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm (last updated Feb. 5, 2002).
Neither the UDRP nor the Rules contain any express provisions for appealing a UDRP decision.
See ICANN, Timeline for the Formulation and Implementation of the Uniform Domain-Name DiSpute-Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrpschedule.htm (last updated Feb. 5, 2002). The UDRP was adopted on August 26, 1999, and implementation documents were approved on October
24, 1999. Id.
Liji Thomas, WhyYouNeedThatPerfectName. Com, at http://www.zongoo.com/
article8457.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
.
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while many others have led to expensive and protracted lawsuits. 5
Recognizing the value of domain names in today's society, the UDRP
was created to protect the rights of trademark holders in securing domain names, while serving as a less expensive and time-consuming alternative for resolving disputes involving these assets. 6
Unfortunately, the UDRPhas failed to reduce the time and expense
involved in resolving many domain name disputes. 7 This inefficiency
is rooted in several factors, including the UDRPs inability to obtain
judicial deference from U.S. courts,8 its inability to assert and maintain effective jurisdiction over participants to a UDRP action,9 and its
initial decision to permit an unlimited number of pleadings and filings in each action. 10 Combined, these problems have led to a stark
reality: complainants in many contested domain name disputes
should skip the UDRP and, instead, proceed directly to court.
This article will explore the birth and development of the UDRP
and how that development resulted in a process that is void of the very
benefits needed for the UDRP to serve as an efficient dispute resolution option. 11 The article will analyze the provisions that hinder the
UDRPs ability to act as an efficient alternative for resolving contested
domain name disputes.l2 It will explain how interpretation by U.S.
courts has undercut the reliability (and thus efficiency) of UDRP decisions. 13 This analysis will focus on a widely publicized domain name
dispute between NetLearning, Inc. and Dan Parisi-one of the first
UDRP decisions reviewed by a U.S. court. 14 The case study will
demonstrate in real terms how the UDRPfailed to fulfill its promise of
5. See Jay Hollander, Why and How to Rent a Domain Name, at http:/ /
www.gigalaw.com/articles/2002-all/hollander-2002-01-all.html (last visited
Feb. 9, 2005).
6. See WlPO Final Report, supra note 1, 'll 49; see also White Paper, supra note 1, at
31746.
7. See discussion infra Section III.
8. See, e.g., Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona,
330 F.3d 617, 626 (4th Cir. 2003) ("Moreover, we give the decision of the
[UDRP] panelist no deference in deciding this action."); Retail Servs., Inc.
v. Freebies Publ'g, 247 F. Supp. 2d 822, 827-28 (E.D. Va. 2003), affd,364
F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating: "Decisions made by arbitration panels
under the UDRP are not afforded deference by the district court."); see also
Parisi v. NetLearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 752 (E.D. Va. 2001) (noting that "the UDRP itself calls for comprehensive, de novo adjudication of
the disputants' rights").
9. See discussion infra Section lILA.
10. See discussion infra Section III.C.
11. See discussion infra Section II.
12. See discussion infra Section II.
13. See discussion infra Section III.B.
14. Several articles and essays regarding this dispute can be found at: http:/ /
www.udrplaw.net/UDRPappealsl.htm;http://www.clm.com/pubs/ pub116
6909_1.html; http://www.perkinscoie.com/casedigest/icdJesults.cfm?key
word 1=domain %20name&topic=Domain %20Names.
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cost and time efficiency.15 The article will conclude by offering three
proposed changes to the VDRP-changes that would enable it to accomplish its goals of providing an inexpensive and timely domain
name dispute resolution mechanism. 16
The results are clear: for many contested domain name disputes, if
aggrieved parties truly want to save time and money, they should proceed straight to court without stopping at the VDRP.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VDRP AND ITS ULTIMATELY
INEFFICIENT DESIGN

To fully understand why the VDRPis inefficient for many contested
domain name disputes, one must first examine how it came to be.
Doing so reveals that, in many respects, the efficiency of the VDRP for
contested matters was probably doomed from the start.
Commentators generally agree that the Internet was created around
1969.17 It started as a system of U.S. Military and Department of Defense networked computers known as "ARPANET" (Advanced Research Projects Agency Network), which was first administered by the
Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA).18 By the end of 1969, ARPANET consisted of four "host
computers" and the "budding Internet was off the ground."19
During the following years, ARPANET added computers to its network while researchers completed a host-to-host protocol and other
network software. 2o The original plans called for limiting network access to individuals involved in defense, education, and research
initiatives. 21
One of the next big benchmarks in Internet history occurred in
1972 when developers introduced "electronic mail."22 Developers
were motivated to create this "hot application" by a need for a device
15. See discussion infra Section IV.
16. See discussion infra Section V.
17. E.g., Sharon K. Sandeen, The Sense and Nonsense of Web Site Terms of Use Agreements, 26 HAMLINE L. REv. 499,504 (2003); Steven Blackerby, Flat Broke and
Busted, but Can I Keep My Domain Name? Domain Name Property Interests in the
1st, 5th, and 11th Circuits, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 117, 120 (2003).
18. White Paper, supra note 1, at 31742.
19. Barry M. Leiner et aI., A Brief History of the Internet, Internet Society, at
http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml (last revised Dec. 10,
2003).
20. Id.
2l. Sandeen, supra note 17, at 505. Significantly, existing plans contemplated
allowing private parties to use "similar technology to create their own networks." Id. Examples of these networks included online service providers
such as Prodigy, CompuServe, and AOL which, before the growth of today's Internet, allowed millions of private individuals to communicate via
their computers through the bulletin board systems. Id.
22. Leiner et aI., supra note 19.
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that simplified communication and coordination. 23 This initial (and
fairly simple) e-mail technology was soon expanded by the creation of
an e-mail program that could "list, selectively read, file, forward, and
respond to messages."24 Mter this development, e-mail became the
most prevalent network application in a decade and was a forerunner
of World Wide Web activity because of its ability to facilitate" 'peopleto-people' traffiC."25 Quite simply, e-mail provided a new way for people to communicate. 26
In the early 1980s, DARPA ceased management of the Internet. 27
When this occurred, the Internet strayed from its original military research initiatives, although some users continued to use it for nonmilitary research and educational purposes. 28 During this time, the
National Science Foundation (NSF) was largely responsible for funding the Internet. 29 By the early 1990s, administrators phased out
ARPANET.30
The 1980s also found developers introducing personal computers
and workstations that, in turn, allowed the budding Internet to
thrive. 3l This led to the Internet's evolution from a primarily noncommercial research device to a more commercialized venture. 32
During this time, personal and home computer use, as well as the
Internet itself, increased exponentially.33 The primary engine for this
change is traced to a World Wide Web application, which enabled
Internet users to connect with networked computers through userfriendly graphical interfaces called web browsers. 34
Beginning in 1991, the NSF assumed responsibility for organizing
and supporting the administration "of the non-military portion of the
Internet infrastructure."35 To accomplish this, the NSF entered into
an agreement with Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) in 1992 to provide
certain Internet-related services, including the registration of domain
names. 36 At that point, NSI managed much of the Internet domain
name system, including key registration and coordination functions. 37
One of NSI's respo.nsibilities was to register domain names in the ge23. Id.
24. Id.
25. !d.
26. Id.
27. White Paper, supra note 1, at
28. Blackerby, supra note 17, at
29. Id. at 120.
30. White Paper, supra note 1, at
31. Leiner et aI., supra note 19.
32. Blackerby, supra note 17, at
33. Id.
34. Id. at 121.
35. White Paper, supra note 1, at
36. Id.
37. Id.

3174l.
120-2l.
31742.
120-2l.
31742.
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neric top-level domains (gTLDs).38 In addition, NSI compiled "a directory linking domain names with the internet protocol (IP)
numbers of domain name servers."39
In 1992, Congress gave the NSF authority for allowing commercial
activity on the NSFNET. 40 This authority, as well as the development
of private and competitive networks, led to an increased commercialization of the Internet, especially through the development of commercial products that utilized the new Internet technologyY
Increased commercialization resulted in vendors using Internet technology in their products. 42 These efforts, however, lacked technical
and strategic information, which resulted in many seeing the entire
effort as an irritation. 43 Commercial vendors and Internet creators
worked together in conferences, tutorials, meetings, workshops, and
training sessions to implement a solution. 44 Following these efforts, a
new phase of commercialization occurred and the Internet developed
into more of a "commodity service."45
Another major milestone occurred in 1991, when Tim Berners-Lee
directed the development of hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) and
hypertext markup language (HTML).46 The creation of HTTP and
HTML "made the transferability and accessibility of information on
the Internet easier and led to the creation of 'the World Wide
Web."'47 Congress followed this breakthrough development by granting the NSF statutory authority to commercialize NSFNET. 48 These
two events are often lauded as the crucial "events leading to the widespread commercial use of the Internet."49

A.

The Creation of the Internet Domain Name System

In order to send information from computer to computer,
networked computers need to have "addresses" where they can locate
information. 5o Administrators solved this problem by creating a system for addressing each computer. 51 This involved merging two distinct components: the domain name and its matching IP number. 52
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

43.
44.
4S.
46.

47.
48.

49.

so.

S1.
S2.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Leiner et aI., supra note 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sandeen, supra note 17, at SOS.
Id.
Id. at S05-06; Holger P. Hesterrneyer, The Invalidity of ICANN's UDRP Under
National Law, 3 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REv. 1,7 (2002).
Sandeen, supra note 17, at S06.
Hestermeyer, supra note 48, at 6-7.
See id. at 7.
WIPO Final Report, supra note 1, 'Il 4.
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The Domain Name System used addresses that included both alphabetical characters and numbers because of individual users' ability to
"remember names better than numbers."53 Specifically, "[dJomain
names are the alphanumeric text strings to the right of an '@' symbol
in an e-mail address, or immediately following the two slashes in a
World Wide Web address."54
On a simplistic level, domain names enable Internet applications to
"talk to" servers on the Internet. 55 The Domain Name System translates the alphanumeric web addresses into the numeric IP addresses
that the network uses to allow a computer to access a certain web
site. 56 Domain names must be unique or Domain Name System servers (as currently designed) will not know the corresponding IP address to which to convert the domain name. 57
The foundation of the Domain Name System is a hierarchy of
names. 58 The top-level domains are normally "divided into two categories: the generic top-level domains (gTLDs) and the country code
top-level domains (ccTLDs)."59 The gTLDs are also separated into
two different types, those that are open and those that are restricted. 6D
Open gTLDs include . com, .net, and .org, and have no restrictions on
who may register names in these domains. 61 Restricted domains include .int, which is only used by international organizations; .gov,
which is only used by United States federal government agencies; .edu,
which is only used by colleges and universities; and . mil, which is only
used by the U.S. Military.62 The country code top-level domains are
derived from a two-letter country code-some of which are restricted
and some of which are open. 63
The creators of the Domain Name System did not contemplate that
these addresses would reflect trademarks. 64 However, companies realized that their domain names could become very valuable resources in
marketing their businesses. 65 This resulted in business owners wanting to register their trademarks and trade names as their Internet address, rather than a random domain name that customers are less
53. Blackerby, supra note 17, at 12l.
54. A. Michael Froomkin, lCANN's "Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy"-Causes
and (Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 605, 615 (2002).
55. Karl M. Manheim & Lawrence B. Solum, An Economic Analysis of Domain
Name Policy, 25 HAsTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 359, 366 (2003).
56. Blackerby, supra note 17, at 12l.
57. Froomkin, supra note 54, at 619.
58. WIPO Final Report, supra note 1, 1[ 4.
59. Id.; see also 'White Paper, supra note 1, at 31742.
60. WIPO Final Report, supra note 1, 1[ 6.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id., 1[ 7.
64. Hestermeyer, supra note 48, at 7.
65. Id.
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likely to remember or associate with their business. 66 Once Internet
users realized that domain names could be a "brand," businesses
quickly concluded that trademark rights should apply to corresponding domain names in order to protect their interests. 57
The Internet Society (ISOC) led the first comprehensive effort to
restructure the Domain Name Administration. 68 InJanuary 1992, the
ISOC consisted of people involved with the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) , whose purpose was to support the engineering tasks of
the Internet. 69 ISOC recognized the international extent of the problem and the interests concerned, and formed an International Ad
Hoc Committee (IAHC), which represented several agencies. 70 The
IAHC suggested that Administrative Domain Name Challenge Panels,
administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), be formed to resolve domain name disputes. 71 Under this
system, registrars of domain names would be obligated to follow the
decisions of the panel, but the decisions would not affect "the power
of competent courts."72
In February 1997, the IAHC contributed to a final report that addressed recommendations for the administration and management of
gTLDs. 73 On July 1, 1997, President William Jefferson Clinton instructed the Department of Commerce to privatize the Domain Name
System to increase competition and assist international participation
in the management of Domain Name System. 74 Under this Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, domain names would receive
intellectual property protection even though normal addresses do
not. 75 On July 2, 1997, the Department of Commerce issued a Request for Comments that sought input on the overall administrative
framework of the Domain Name System, the creation of new top-level
domains, domain name registrars' policies, and trademark issues. 76
B.

The Green and White Papers: Two Defining Documents for Domain
Name Rights

In January 1998, after receiving comments to the Department of
Commerce'sJuly 1997 request, the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA), an agency of the Department of
Commerce, issued A Proposal to Improve the Technical Management of In66.
67.
68.
69.

70.
71.
72.
73.

74.
75.
76.

Id.
Froomkin, supra note 54, at 620.
Hestermeyer, supra note 48, at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
[d.
WIPO Final &part, supra note 1, ~ 15.
Id., ~ 16.
Id., ~ 24.
Id., ~ 16.
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ternet Names and Addresses (the Green Paper).77 The Green Paper discussed issues such as the creation of a private U.S. corporation
managed by a "globally and functionally representative Board of Directors. "78 The Green Paper stated that existing procedures for conflict
resolution were "expensive and cumbersome"79 and insisted on a balance between the Internet community and trademark holders in
which trademark holders received the same rights on the Internet as
they do in the physical world. 80
The Green Paper also stressed that the proposed entity be incorporated under the laws of the United States. 81 In support, the Green Paper looked to the United States' significant experience with the
Domain Name System. 82 Even though the corporation would be incorporated in the United States, it would remain subject to the jurisdiction of other nations. 83 The Green Paper suggested that this
corporation be structured as a private, nonprofit entity charged with
coordinating specific Domain Name System functions for the Internet
as a whole. 84 WIPO reiterated its desire that the process only encompass international protection of intellectual property rights, rather
than serve as a comprehensive Internet governance structure. 85
The Green Paper also recommended that the domain name dispute
resolution process be conducted online and that each domain name
registry develop its own system with prescribed minimum standards. 86
These systems should provide that, if a trademark holder objects to
the registration of a domain name within a set time, the domain name
registrar should temporarily suspend that registration from any use. 87
In order to establish consistent and predictable locations in which to
resolve disputes, the Green Paper suggested that all domain name registration contracts have a clause requiring registrants to consent to the
jurisdiction of the country where the domain name registry is located
or the country where the relevant "A" server is located. 88
Further comments and discussions about the Green Paper led to the
publication of the Statement of Policy on the Management of Internet Names
77. Id.,
78. Id.

~

17.

79. Hestermeyer, supra note 48.
80. Id.
8l. "White Paper, supra note 1, at 31744.
82. Id., at 31744-45.
83. Id., at 31745. Even though the Green Paper realized that incorporating
under United States laws would cause dissent, it also realized the practical
reality that, if the corporation were located elsewhere, similar objections to
location would still arise. White Paper, supra note 1, at 31745.
84. Hestermeyer, supra note 48, at 13; "White Paper, supra note 1, at 31744.
85. Hestermeyer, supra note 48, at 16-17.
86. Id., at 13.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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and Addresses (the White Paper) inJune 1998. 89 In this paper, the government agreed that trademark owners were victimized by some abusive domain name registration practices. 90 "Cyber-pirates" were
victimizing trademark owners by registering domain names similar, if
not identical, to the owner's trademark, and then selling the domain
names to the trademark holder at a profit. 91
As with its predecessor, the White Paper proposed establishing a private, nonprofit U.S. corporation to generally govern the Internet. 92
The White Paper suggested that W1PO create a procedure for welcoming trademark holders to the Internet community and develop proposals for uniform resolution of trademark domain name disputes. 93
The recommendations in the White Paper distinguished between situations that would not be covered by the proposed recommendations
(such as domain name disputes between two trademark holders) and
those that would be covered (such as domain name disputes between
a trademark holder and someone who does not have a trademark).94
The conclusion was that this new domain name dispute system would
focus only on situations that fell under the latter category.95

C.

The WIPO Report

Following the recommendations of the Green Paper and the White
Paper, W1PO published an interim report in December 1998 that addressed domain name dispute resolution. 96 The W1PO report recommended that, in domain name disputes, domain name registration
agreements include a clause requiring registrants to submit to the jurisdiction of its country of domicile and the country where registration authority is located, if these countries are members of the Paris
Convention or the A~reement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 9
The W1PO Report suggested that the uniform administrative dispute resolution mechanism be Internet-based. 98 The report also provided that this process be modeled after Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) proceedings. 99 This ADR-like proceeding would
determine the rights of parties to domain name disputes involving
89. WIPO Final Report, supra note 1,1 18; see also Hestermeyer, supra note 48, at
14.
90. Froomkin, supra note 54, at 622-23.
91. [d., at 623.
92. Hestermeyer, supra note 48, at 14.
93. [d.
94. Froomkin, supra note 54, at 623.
95. [d.
96. Hestermeyer, supra note 48, at 17.
97. [d.
98. [d., at 18.
99. [d.
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supposed violations of intellectual property rights. lOO The WIPO Report further proposed that remedies be limited to canceling or transferring ownership of a domain name, and would not preclude
litigation or a de novo review of the decision. 101 Ultimately, decisions
by a court of competent jurisdiction would prevail over a differing
decision from an ADR determination. 102

D.

The Creation oj the UDRP

InJuly 1998, WIPO undertook an extensive international consultation termed "the WIPO Process" to make domain name recommendations to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
("ICANN").I03 ICANN served as the nonprofit, private U.S. corporation established to manage the domain name system by approving policies and measures for handling domain name disputes as well as
accrediting of domain name registrars. 104 ICANN was also charged
with adopting procedures and policies for handling domain name disputes via an administrative process. 105 In April 1999, WIPO delivered
its "Final Report" to ICANN. 106
Although WIPO's Final Report proposed an ADR process (the
UDRP), it carefully provided that this process "should not deny access
to litigation or have a mandatory value as precedent for national
courts whose decisions prevail in case of conflict with outcomes of ...
ADR proceeding[s]."107 In addition, WIPO did not view this ADR process as equivalent to binding arbitration, instead providing that binding arbitration was only optiona1. 108
Throughout this process, the general consensus discussed the implications of using trademarks as domain names. 109 The process recognized that consumers may be misled about the source of a product or
services when a trademark is used as a domain name and the trademark owner did not consent to this use. 110 If trademark owners could
protect their rights only via expensive litigation, business owners
would lack confidence in the Internet's ability to protect their trademarks and cyberspace might not function efficientlyYl
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. WIPO Final Report, supra note 1, at v.
104. Id.; see also Clark D. Robertson, Casenote, Carinthians Soccer Loses By Decision
in Second Round Play-off over Carinthians.com in Sallen v. Corinthians
Licenciamentos LTDA, 11 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. FORUM 49, 56 (2004).
105. Robertson, supra note 104, at 56.
106. See WIPO Final Report, supra note 1.
107. Hestermeyer, supra note 48, at 19-20.
108. Id., at 18.
109. White Paper, supra note 1, at 31746.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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ICANN implemented the UDRP in August 1999.11 2 Composed of
the UDRP Policy itself, as well as a set of procedural rules, the UDRP
became the administrative process for handling disputes involving domain names. ll3 The UDRPs power was derived from ICANN's jurisdiction over the regulation of domain namesY4 ICANN wielded this
power because someone who acquires a domain name obtains the
name from a registrar who received the right to offer names from an
ICANN-approved domain name registry.115
Under the UDRP, complainants can select a dispute administrator
from among several administrators accredited by ICANN.116 The new
policy provided that when a domain name is registered or an existing
registration is renewed, the registering party "must agree to the UDRP
in the registration agreement, otherwise they cannot register the domain name."1l7
With this, the goal of providing a quick and inexpensive domain
name dispute resolution option was born. Unfortunately, the promise
of an especially efficient resolution for domain name disputes became
more of a theory than a reality.
III.

THE UDRPS OWN PROVISIONS PREVENT IT FROM SERVING AS AN EFFICIENT DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE
MECHANISM

The UDRPs inability to efficiently resolve domain name disputes is
primarily self-inflicted. In particular, several provisions in the UDRP
Rules, as well as the UDRP Policy itself, have essentially gutted the
UDRPs efficiency for resolving these disputes. This section will analyze three provisions that most obviously provoke this inefficiency and
conclude with a case study that illustrates this point.
A.

The UDRP Is Inefficient Because Its Own Provisions Undermine Its Professed Mandatory Nature

The UDRP plainly professes to require mandatory participation by a
registrant, as signaled by the section heading "Mandatory Administrative Proceeding."ll8 Specifically, the UDRP provides: "[t]his paragraph sets forth the type of disputes for which you [the registrant] are
required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding."ll9
Clearly, the UDRP is designed to convince domain name registrants
that participation in the dispute resolution process is mandatory.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Robertson, supra note 104, at 57.
Id.
Froomkin, supra note 54, at 612.
Id.
Robertson, supra note 104, at 57.
Id.
118. UDRP, supra note 2, § 4.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
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The UDRPs mandatory nature arises from the fact that the policy is
part of the standard domain name registration contract between a domain registrar and the registrant. 120 This means that any individual or
entity that enters into a domain name registration contract (for a domain name within the scope of the UDRP21) also, whether wittingly or
not, agrees to be subject to the UDRPs terms. 122
The UDRPs mandatory participation requirement results solely
from this contract, therefore, the UDRP can only be enforced against
parties to contract. In other words, the UDRP cannot require prospective complainants to participate in the UDRP dispute resolution process because they are not a party to the domain name registration
contract at issue.
The practical result is that, because a complainant is not a party to
the contract but the domain name registrant is, a complainant who
files a UDRP action can force a registrant to participate in a mandatory
UDRP proceeding, but the registrant cannot do the saine to the complainant. 123 This represents the most obvious difference between
traditional binding arbitration and the UDRP. in traditional arbitration, the contract mandating arbitration is between the disputing parties whereas, in the UDRP, one of the disputing parties is not even a
party to the agreement that requires arbitration.
The fact that a prospective complainant is never a party to the domain name registration contract does not abrogate the alleged
mandatory nature of the UDRP, even though the UDRPs mandatory
nature is clearly and completely one-sided. Despite purporting to
mandate participation by registrants, other provisions undermine
mandatory participation by essentially relieving the domain name registrants from mandatory participation. 124 This scenario reduces any
real semblance of mandatory participation, which gravely affects the
UDRPs ability to serve as a cost effective and time efficient alternative
to traditional litigation. 125 The following subsections explore the rationale behind the uniform decisions by U.S. courts to adopt a de
novo standard of review for UDRP cases.
120. Annette Kur, UDRP, MAx-PLANCK INST. for FOREIGN & INT'L PAT., CopyRIGHT & COMPETITION L. 12 (2002), at http://www.intellecprop.mpg.de/
Online-Publikationen/2002/UDRP-study-final-02.pdf.
121. See id. Not all domain names are subject to the UDRP. See WIPO Final Report, supra note 1, ~ 43. Instead, only gTLDs and those ccTLDs that voluntarily adopt the UDRP fall within the purview of the UDRP. Id., ~ 43.
122. See Kur, supra note 121, at 12.
123. This primarily means that a domain name registrant's request for a finding
that a complainant engaged in reverse cyber-squatting carries no substantive weight. See WIPO Final Report, supra note 1, ~ 43. This is because the
non-domain name registrant cannot be held accountable for such conduct
since the non-domain name registrant is not a party to the domain name
registration contract. See id., ~ 43.
124. UDRP, supra note 2, §§ 4(k), 5.
125. See WIPO Final Report, supra note 1, ~ 158.
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A Domain Name Registrant's Ability to Circumvent, or Even Completely Avoid, Mandatory Participation in the UDRP Undermines
the Efficiency of the UDRP

The UDRP professes to be a mandatory proceeding for domain
name registrants;126 however, at nearly any stage of a UDRP proceeding, a domain name registrant can simply opt out of participation. 127
For example, the section entitled "Availability of Court Proceedings"
reveals that participation by domain name registrants is not
mandatory. Before a UDRP panel decision is implemented, the registrant can essentially short-circuit the UDRP proceeding by filing a
court action."128 Procedurally, this provision enables a domain name
registrant to avoid the entire "mandatory" UDRP process by simply filing a court action (most likely a declaratory relief action) "before such
mandatory administrative proceeding is commenced."129 The registrant can easily avoid participation in the UDRP proceeding-even if
the complainant has invested time and expense in preparing the
UDRP complaint. 130 Such a scenario hardly promotes the UDRPs primary goal of efficiency. Instead, it discourages complainants from investing even the comparatively small amount of time and money
needed to prepare and file a UDRP action.
Revising this section to eliminate the domain name registrant's
right to file a court action would eliminate this disincentive and establish a system that actually mandates participation by the domain name
registrant in practice rather than just in name. 131 As is, this provision
undermines mandatory participation by the domain name registrant
that, in tum, undermines the UDRPs ability to serve as a cost and time
efficient domain name dispute alternative.
Even more troubling, the UDRPs language essentially empowers a
domain name registrant to circumvent a UDRP action-even after the
complaint is filed. 132 Specifically, Section 18 contemplates the filing of
legal proceedings not only before the complainant files a UDRP action
but also during the UDRP action. 133 As a result, a complainant can
prepare a complaint, pay the UDRP filing fee, and prosecute an ac126. UDRP, supra note 2, § 4.
127. See id. §§ 4(k), 5.
128. [d. § 4(k). "The mandatory administrative proceeding requirements set
forth in Paragraph 4 shall not prevent either you [the registrant] or the
complainant from submitting the dispute to a court of competent jurisdiction for independent resolution before such mandatory administrative proceeding is commenced or after such a proceeding is concluded." [d.
(emphasis added).
129. [d.
130. [d. §§ 4(g), (k).
13l. [d. § 4.
132. See Rules, supra note 2, § 18(a).
133. [d.
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tion, only to have that time and expense wasted if the domain name
registrant files a lawsuit before the UDRP panel issues its decision.
Under this scenario, a complainant would better serve his or her
cause by filing a court action from the onset. Although, Section 18
provides a UDRP panel the discretion to "proceed to a decision" even
if a lawsuit is filed,I34 in practice, it makes little sense for a UDRP panel
to do so. As discussed later, courts generally give no deference to
UDRP panel decisions. 135
If the UDRP truly was a mandatory proceeding for domain name
registrants, why would its drafters permit a domain name registrant to
undermine the process by filing a lawsuit before or during the dispute? Clearly, a domain name registrant's ability to pursue relief beyond the UDRP belies the claim of mandatory participation.
2.

Post-Decision Rights That the UDRP Affords to Registrants Undermines the Efficiency of the UDRP

The registrant's ability to circumvent mandatory participation by filing a court action reduces the UDRPs ability to serve as a less expensive and time-consuming dispute resolution option. 136 Those
provisions could be termed the registrant's "Pre-Decision" rights.
Unfortunately, the UDRPs provisions also afford 'domain name registrants "Post-Decision" rights that further undermine the UDRP because a domain name registrant can, for all practical purposes,
completely ignore a UDRP complaint filed against him or her. 137 Even
if the UDRP panel orders the transfer or cancellation of a domain
name, the registrant need only file an independent court action
within ten days of the panel's decision to render the entire panel process moot and unenforceable. 138 This presents a real credibility problem for the UDRP. Though the UDRPclaims to be "mandatory"-and
in fact provides for relief in the form of a domain name transfer or
cancellation l39-there is little incentive for investing time or money in
the UDRP action once it becomes clear that the registrant will contest
the matter because the registrant can easily render the UDRP ruling
useless by filing a court action within the prescribed time. 140
Even more damning is the fact that U.S. courts consistently refuse
to defer to the UDRP process, even when the registrant actively participates in the UDRP action but later contests the UDRPs ruling in
134. [d.
135. See infra Part III.B.; see also Weber-Stephens Prods. Co. v. Armitage Hardware & Bldg. Supply, Inc., No. 00C1738, 2000 WL 562470, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

May 3, 2000).
UDRP, supra note 2, § 4(k); see also WIPO Final Report, supra note 1, 1[ 158.
UDRP, supra note 2, § 4(k).
[d.
[d. § 3.
[d. § 4(k).
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court. 141 This leads to the second major inefficiency: courts generally
review UDRP decisions de novo.
B.

The UDRP Is Inefficient Because U.S. Courts Generally Do Not Afford
UDRP Decisions Any Deference

One of the guiding principles in the Initial WIPO Report was the
need for an expedited process designed to reduce the time and expense of domain name disputes: "[t]he procedure should permit the
parties to resolve a dispute expeditiously and at a low cost."142 Because the Internet is a fast-changing medium, an expedited and inexpensive UDRP process would be an advantage over lengthy and
expensive court litigation. 143
While recognizing the desirability of these traits, the Initial WIPO
Report was equally committed to the proposition that parties be able
to forgo the UDRP and seek relief in court. l44 The report was convinced that "a party should be free to initiate litigation by filing a
claim in a competent national court instead of initiating the administrative procedure."145 This resolve was based on "a natural level of
discomfort in placing complete trust in a system which is new and
which has the capacity to affect valued rights."146
To accomplish this goal, the Initial WIPO Report suggested that the
UDRP process be distinctly different from mandatory and binding arbitration. 147 This suggestion was based on the fact that, in many countries, an agreement to submit to binding arbitration is essentially an
agreement to abandon one's right to litigate a matter in court. 148
Therefore, where the UDRPprocess is treated as a mandatory, binding
arbitration process, it would preclude a party from later seeking court
relief.
On one level, this suggestion makes sense: limiting a party's redress
to a new and unproven dispute mechanism could lead to unsuspected
prejudice if the new mechanism turned out to be flawed. 149 However,
the desire to treat the UDRP process as less than binding arbitration
14l. See Retail Servs., Inc. v. Freebies Publ'g, 247 F. Supp. 2d 822, 827-28 (E.D.
Va.2003).
142. WIPO Final Report, supra note 1,1 IS0(i}.
143. Id.,l 148.
144. Id., 11 IS0(iv}.
14S. Id.
146. Id., 11 133, (noting that "[t]here has been, in consequence, in some
quarters, a reluctance to abandon all possibilities of resort to litigation as a
result of the adoption of new procedures, at least in the first stage before
experience of a new system").
147. Id., 11 ISO (iv).
148. Id., 11 138.
149. This suggestion allows the UDRP to avoid the thorny issue of forcing a nondomain name registrant to relinquish the right to litigate in court when the
non-domain name registrant was not a party to the domain name registration contract that implements the UDRP.

176

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 34

ultimately works against the UDRPs goal of establishing a quick and
inexpensive resolution mechanism. 150 This occurs because a domain
name registrant can simply ignore a UDRP action filed against it; even
if the registrant is the most incorrigible of cyber-squatters, a registrant
need only file a court action within ten days of the UDRP decision to
render that decision essentially meaningless. 151
Worse still, this "appeal"IS2 exacerbates the inefficiencies because
U.S. courts generally have not deferred to the findings or holdings of
a UDRP panel. 153 The issue was first addressed in Weber-Stephen Prods.
Co. v. Armitage Hardware & Bldg. Supply, Inc.,Is4 where the court held:
[T] his Court is not bound by the outcome of the ICANN
administrative proceedings. But at this time we decline to
determine the precise standard by which we would review
the panel's decision, and what degree of deference (if any)
we would give that decision. Neither the ICANN Policy nor
its governing rules dictate to courts what weight should be
given to a panel's decision, and the WIPO e-mail message
stating that "a court may give appropriate weight to the Administrative Panel's decision" confirms the breadth of our
discretion. ISS
The finding in Weber-Stephen that courts should not defer to UDRP decisions and, instead, review them de novo, began a trend followed by
other federal courts. Courts have consistently stated that UDRP decisions should receive no deference. ls6 Recently, in Barcelona.com, Inc.
v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona,IS7 the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals offered some of the strongest language to date against
deference:
[I]ndeed the WIPO panelist's decision is not even entitled to
deference on the merits. A brief review of the scheme established by ICANN in adopting the UDRP and by Congress in
enacting the ACPA informs our resolution of this issue.
Moreover, any decision made by a panel under the UDRP is
no more than an agreed-upon administration that is not
150. WIPO Final Report, supra note 1,1 150(i).
151. UDRP, supra note 2, § 4(k).
152. The UDRP does not specifically provide for an appeal. However, by allowing the losing party to prevent the implementation of a UDRP panel
decision by filing a court action within the prescribed time, the UDRP essentially creates the opportunity for appellate review though it is not called
as such. See id.
153. See Parisi v. NetLearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 652 (E.D. Va. 2001).
154. No. 00C1738, 2000 WL 562470 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2000). "No federal court
has yet considered the legal effect of a WIPO proceeding." Id. at *1.
155. Id. at *2.
156. Bord v. Banco de Chile, 205 F. Supp. 2d 521, 523 (E.D. Va. 2002).
157. 330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2003).
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given any deference under the ACPA. To the contrary, because a UDRP decision is susceptible of being grounded on
principles foreign or hostile to American law, the ACPA authorizes reversing a panel decision if such a result is called
for by application of the Lanham Act. . . .
... Moreover, we give the decision of the WIPO panelist no
deference in deciding this action .... 158
While possibly more direct than other courts, the Fourth Circuit's
refusal to defer comports with other U.S. court decisions. When
courts reach such a uniform conclusion on a relatively new legal issue,
it is often instructive to consider whether the reasoning supporting
these conclusions is uniform or disjointed. U.S. courts have generally
relied on two distinct, yet common, findings in concluding that UDRP
decisions should receive no deference. The following subsections explore these rationales.
l.

The UDRP Is Distinct from Arbitration Agreements Subject to the
Federal Arbitration Act

In concluding that UDRP decisions should not be afforded deference, courts considered whether UDRPactions are analogous to binding arbitration proceedings. In doing so, the courts concluded that
UDRP decisions, although similar to binding arbitration, are not
equivalent. 159
One of the first cases to consider this issue was Parisi v. NetLeaming,
Inc. 160 In Parisi, the defendant NetLeaming (who prevailed in a
UDRP decision against Parisi that precipitated the lawsuit at issue) argued that the UDRP was arbitration within the scope of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).161 NetLeaming based this argument on a provision in the FAA that defines the types of proceedings subject to the
Act:
[a] written provision in any ... contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction,
158. [d. at 623, 626.
159. See Parisi, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 751-52. For that matter, even the UDRP panel
is not sure how UDRP proceedings should be classified. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Jeff Burgar, Nat'l Arb. Forum 0002000093564 (Apr. 10, 2000)
(Froomkin, Arb., dissenting) ("I agree with the majority that this panel,
whether viewed as engaged in an international arbitration or an administrative procedure, has both the power and the duty to determine whether it
has jurisdiction.").
160. 139 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Va. 2001).
161. See NetLearning, Inc.'s Reply Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss at 2,
Parisi v. NetLearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Va. 2001) (No. 001823-A). A detailed case study of the NetLeaming, Inc., v. Parisi UDRP and
federal court proceedings is found in Section N of this article.
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or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract. 162
Based on this language, NetLearning argued:
[T]o be considered [an] arbitration provision, only three elements are required: (1) a contract; (2) which evidences a
transaction involving commerce; (3) which is designed to settle a controversy by arbitration. In this case, a comparison of
the UDRP and the Federal Arbitration Action clearly reveals
that the UDRP satisfies these elements and, thus, constitutes
an arbitration provision. 163
NetLearning argued that Parisi's agreement with a domain name registrar represented a contract; his payment of registration fees evidenced a commerce-based transaction; and, the presence of the UDRP
within the domain name registration agreement was designed to settle
a controversy in an arbitrable format. 164
While recognizing that the UDRP represented a "contract-based
scheme for addressing disputes between domain name registrants and
third parties challenging the registration and use of their domain
names," the Parisi court concluded that the UDRP was not subject to
the FAA.165 The court reasoned that the UDRPs "unique contractual
arrangement" was inconsistent with judicial review standards under
the FAA.166
In reaching its decision, the Parisi court cited four factors that distinguished the UDRP from an arbitration agreement subject to the
FAA.167 First, the court concluded that the UDRPs provision for parallel UDRP and court litigation obviated the FAA's provision for the
staying of litigation during an arbitration proceeding. 168 Second, the
UDRP could not be considered compelled arbitration subject to the
FAA because a UDRP complainant is not a party to the contract between the domain name registrant and the registrar. 169 Third, the
UDRP does not satisfy the FAA's requirement that the parties to an
arbitration agree that a court judgment shall be entered upon the ar162. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.CA § 2 (1999).
163. See NetLeaming Inc.'s Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 2-3,
Parisi v. NetLearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Va. 2001) (No. 001823-A).
164. [d. at 3.
165. Parisi, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 75l.
166. [d.
167. [d. at 751-52.
168. [d. at 75l.
169. [d.
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bitrator's ruling. l7O Finally, the Parisi court noted that the UDRP
neither contemplated nor fostered the deference normally contemplated for a binding arbitration: "[t]he UDRPs contemplation of parallel litigation and abbreviated proceedings does not invite such
deference."171
Based on these distinctions, the Parisi court concluded that, while
analogous to an arbitration agreement, the UDRP nevertheless lacked
certain traditional characteristics of binding arbitration, thereby removing the UDRP (and appeals of UDRP decisions) from governance
under the FAA. 172
In Dluhos v. Strasberg, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals also considered whether a court's review of a UDRP decision was subject to the
FAA.173 Similar to the result in Parisi, the Dluhos court answered no to
that question. 174 In reasoning very similar to that of Parisi, the Dluhos
court based its holding on the fact that the UDRP was never designed
to replace court actions, but only to provide an alternative. 175 The
Dluhos court concluded that treating a UDRP decision as a type of
binding arbitration governed by the FAA would frustrate the UDRPs
original design. 176 The court compared this to trying to force a
"square-peg UDRP proceeding into the round hole of the Federal Arbitration ACt."l77 The significance of these rulings (and the underlying reason why NetLearning offered this argument in the first place)
is best appreciated by considering the effect of subjecting the UDRP to
the FAA.

2.

u.S. Courts Have Generally Afforded Great Deference to the
Holdings of Arbitration Proceedings Subject to the Federal Arbitration Act

Similar to the goals of the UDRP, arbitration proceedings were established to create a dispute resolution mechanism for legal conflicts
that was faster, less expensive, and less formal than ordinary court proceedings. 178 Because of this goal, courts are reticent to vacate or modify arbitration decisions. There is a presumption of upholding the
Id. at 752.
Id.
Id. at 753.
321 F.3d 365 (3d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 372-73.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 372; see also Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14,
26-27 (1st Cir. 2001).
178. 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Disp. Resol. § 8 (2004); see also Apex Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. U.S. Supply Co., 142 F.3d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating "the
purpose of having arbitration at all [is] the quick resolution of disputes and
the avoidance of the expense and delay associated with litigation").
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
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arbitrator's decision-even though it is an extrajudicial creature-because the law favors the benefits of arbitration. 179
The FAA governs the vast majority of arbitrations. ISO In doing so, it
affords great deference to an arbitrator's decision. lSI Thus, arbitrators are given broad discretion and authority: "[AJny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues, as well as any doubts concerning the
scope of the arbitrators' remedial authority, are to be resolved in favor
of the arbitrators' authority as a matter of federal law and policy."Is2
To codify the policy decision of broad arbitrator discretion, the FAA
narrowly restricts a court's authority to overturn an arbitration decision. IS3 These limited circumstances include: 1) when an arbitration
decision is obtained through "corruption, fraud, or undue means;" 2)
when there is evidence of "partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,
or either of them;" 3) when an arbitrator ignores reasonable requests
to postpone an arbitration, when an arbitrator ignores "evidence pertinent and material to the controversy," when an arbitrator engages in
any other prejudicial "misbehavior;" or, lastly and most generally; 4)
when "the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made."ls4
The practical effect of broad deference is that a court cannot vacate
an award-even if it disagrees with an arbitrator's factual findings or
legal conclusions-as long as the decision comports with the FAA.ls5
This approach enables binding arbitration to truly be binding in most
instances. That, in turn, allows the majority of parties to obtain a resolution in a faster, less expensive, and less formal manner-all goals
that arbitration shares with the UDRP in name but not in practice. 1S6
Unfortunately, the UDRP was not structured as a binding dispute
resolution mechanism, so the FAA's finality is absent in UDRP proceedings. 1s7 As a result, a complainant who enters a UDRP proceeding lacks the certainty that his or her dispute will be resolved, as
179. Apex Plumbing, 142 F.3d at 193.
180. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (applying any maritime or commercial transaction
involving arbitration); see also William P. Byrne, The Effect of RICO on Maritime Arbitration, 12 TuL. MAR. LJ. 77, 78 (1987) (noting that "[t]he Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) governs most agreements to arbitrate commercial
disputes") .
181. See Apex Plumbing, 142 F.3d at 193 (finding that the "[r]eview of an arbitrator's award is severely circumscribed"); Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141, 145 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that "[g]reat
deference is given to arbitration awards").
182. Peoples Sec., 991 F.2d at 147 (quoting Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v.
Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353,358 (N.D. Ala. 1984)).
183. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
184. Id.
185. See Peoples Sec., 991 F.2d at 145.
186. See supra Part II.D.
187. See supra Part II.D.
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compared with a complainant in a binding arbitration under the
FAA. 188
One response to this reasoning is that a complainant who files a
court action also lacks the finality of a binding arbitration because a
court action also may be appealed. While true in one context, this
argument misses the big picture. If a complainant in a domain name
dispute proceeded directly to court and bypassed the UDRP, that complainant would be one step closer to final appellate review-ultimately
where true finality resides. In this respect, because courts have decided not to afford UDRP decisions deference, it is essentially a nonbinding proceeding. As the following section demonstrates, the
reason courts have not deferred is that the UDRPs own provisions and
history provides for de novo review.

3.

The UDRPs "Legislative History" Suggests That Courts Should
Use a De Novo Standard When Reviewing UDRP Decisions

The conclusion by U.S. courts that UDRP decisions should be reviewed de novo does not simply result from the court's own analysis of
the UDRP.189 Rather, the WIPO Final Report-which essentially
amounts to the UDRPs "legislative history"-recommends de novo review. 190 Unfortunately, neither the UDRP nor its "legislative history"
provides much specific insight into why the UDRP drafters believed
courts should not afford deference on review. The UDRPs discomfort
with allowing its decisions to bind courts appears centered on the
multi-national nature of UDRP proceedings and the likely nuances
among international legal systems. 191 In particular, the WIPO Final
Report explained:
The multijurisdictional and multifunctional nature of the Internet mean that, inevitably, many different interests in many
different parts of the world will be concerned with any endeavor to formulate specific policies. Special care needs to
be exercised to ensure that any policy developed for one interest or function does not impact undul~ on, or interfere
unduly with, other interests or functions. 1 2
Because the UDRP aspires to resolve global disputes,193 adopting an
American or even Westernized legal model carte blanche is inappropriate. Nevertheless, the UDRPs Final Report found that arbitration has
broad support worldwide as a method for resolving disputes. 194 For
example, the Final Report noted that more than 100 countries have
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See supra Part liLA.
See WIPO Final Report, supra note 1,
/d.
/d.,
/d.,

~
~

150(v).
3.
See id., Preamble.
Id., ~ 138.

~

150(iv).
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embraced binding arbitration, either through their own laws or by becoming a party to the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958. 195 Thus, adopting a
binding arbitration model clearly would not have placed the UDRP in
the waters of unknown or untested legal thought or procedure. Nevertheless, even though binding arbitration is widely accepted, the
UDRP drafters seemed determined to require de novo review and thus
avoid a binding nature. 196
The WIPO Final Report did at least leave open some doors for another approach in the future. For example, the WIPO Final Report
stated that nonbinding arbitration was appropriate "at least in the initial stage of the new management of the DNS," the implication being
that binding arbitration might be appropriate at a later stage. 197
Moreover, the WIPO Final Report "hoped" its decisions would develop its own body of law so that UDRP participants would one day
resist court review. 198
However, any chance for this "hope" to be realized is undercut by
the UDRPs stated fear of adopting a binding nature. 199 As de novo
court review is available, there is little incentive for a losing party to
submit to the UDRP decision when a reviewing court is not bound by
any ofthe UDRPs factual findings or legal conclusions. 20o The "hope"
of a consistent and credible body of law is merely an altruistic reason
to forgo a potentially better result upon court review.
No doubt the creators of the UDRPwanted it to serve as an efficient
arbiter of domain name disputes. 201 However, the UDRPs own refusal
to structure itself in the model of a binding arbitration proceeding
undermines this goal. The fact that its legislative history argues
against legal deference is just another example of the UDRPs conflicting desires. Ultimately, this undercuts the UDRPs ability to serve as
an efficient dispute resolution mechanism for contested disputes.
C.

The UDRP Is Inefficient Because It Permits the Possibility oj an Unlimited Number oj Supplemental Filings

As will be demonstrated in the following case study, drafters of the
UDRP made a threshold decision that further damaged efforts to reduce time and cost. Specifically, the UDRP allowed dispute resolution

providers total discretion on whether to permit supplemental pleadId.
Id.
Id.
See id., 11 IS3 (stating that "[i]t is to be hoped, however, that with experience and time, confidence will be built up in the credibility and consistency
of decisions made under the procedure, so that the parties would resort less
and less to litigation.").
199. See id., 11 IS0(iv).
200. See id.
201. See, e.g., id., 11 IS0(i)-(ii).
19S.
196.
197.
198.
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ings beyond the UDRP complaint and answer. 202 According to one
staff report, the UDRP opted not to define standards for supplemental
filings in order to accommodate language differences:
The posted rules of procedure provided for limits on the
length of complaints and responses filed in the administrative dispute-resolution procedure. They al50 provided for length
guidelines for decisions and dissenting opinions. However, the limits were left blank and comments invited. A few comments were received, but there was divergence in the lengths proposed by the
commentators. Staff recommends that the limits and guidelines be
established by each dispute-resolution provider's supplemental
rules. 203
Ceding the decision to individual dispute resolution providers was
rooted in the WIPO Final Report. 204 Specifically, UDRPcreators made
a threshold decision to give dispute resolution providers broad discretion in administering UDRP actions, including discretion on the number of supplemental filings.205
In response, UDRP dispute resolution providers decided not to expressly limit the length or number of supplemental filings by parties
to a UDRP action. 206 Instead, UDRP complainants and respondents
may file an unrestricted number of supplemental pleadings and, at
least under the National Arbitration Forum's (NAF) Supplemental
Rules, supplemental pleadings may have an unlimited number of
pages and exhibits, annexes, attachments, or the equivalent. 207 Failing to restrain the number of additional pleadings creates an incentive for a zealous advocate to file unnecessary pleadings in the hope of
202. See ICANN, Second Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy, 1 1.4 at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-secondstaff-report-24oct99.htm (last modified Oct. 25, 1999) [hereinafter Second
Report]; see also Rules, supra note 2, §§ 10, 12.
203. See Second Report, supra note 205, at 1 4.14 (emphasis added).
204. See The Management of Internet names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues,
Annex V: Rules for Administrative Procedure Concerning Abusive Domain Name
Registrations [hereinafter Annex V], arts. 21-22, available at http://arbiter.
wipo.int/processes/processl/report/doc/annex05.doc (last visited Feb.
05, 2005).
205. Annex V, supra note 207, arts. 21, 23. In particular, article 21 provides that
"[s]ubject to these Rules, the Panel may conduct the proceedings in such
manner as it considers appropriate." Id. at art. 21. Article 23 further provides that "[t]he Panel may, in its discretion, allow or require further statements from the Parties." Id. at art. 23.
206. See National Arbitration Forum UDRP Supplemental Rules [hereinafter NAF's
Supplemental Rules], R. 7, at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/UDRP/
rules.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2005); see also World Intellectual Property Organization Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/ domains/rules/supplemental/index.html (last visited Feb. 05, 2005) [hereinafter WIPO Supplemental Rules].
207. See NAF's Supplemental Rules, supra note 209, R. 7.
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getting the last word, and responding to the opposition's attempts to
do the same.
One obvious side effect is that legal fees will increase with every
additional pleading. Ultimately, the policy of unlimited supplemental
pleadings often serves to increase legal fees for prosecuting or defending a UDRP claim, which direcdy contradicts the UDRPs purpose.
The potential for abuse is more than theoretical, as the following
case study demonstrates. Indeed, this is just one lesson learned from
the Parisi v. NetLearning matter-an excellent case demonstrating why
the UDRP can be an inefficient option for domain name disputes.
IV.

PARISI V. NETLEARNING: HOW THE UDRP FAILED ITS
GOALS

Pointing out the UDRPs structural flaws is more instructive when
illustrated by an actual dispute. This section provides an in-depth
analysis of the domain name dispute between Dan Parisi and
NetLearning, Inc. 208 in order to demonstrate the UDRPs flaws.
A.

The Somewhat Strange Events Which Led to the Parisi v. NetLearning
Dispute

The origins of the dispute between Parisi and NetLearning seemed
innocuous enough. On April 1, 1996, Parisi filed a federal "'intent to
use' service mark application for the [service mark] 'Nedearning'.''209
Approximately one month later, Parisi registered at least eighteen different domain names with Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI), including
netlearning.com, for two-year terms at a cost of approximately fIfty
dollars per domain name. 210 The registered domain names covered a
range of areas, including sports-related and medical-related domain
names. 211 When Parisi registered these domain names, he admitted
that he did not have any corporate, fInancing, or other business plans
for these domain names, including the nedearning.com domain
name. 212
Notably, the May 1996 nedearning.com registration was not the
only time Parisi registered the nedearning.com domain name. InJuly
1998, Parisi registered the netlearning.com domain name a second
208. See Parisi v. NetLearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 743 (E.D. Va. 2001).
209. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and
Judgment on the Pleadings at 2, Ex. A, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (on file with
author).
210. See Deposition of Dan Parisi at 61,67, dep. exs. 1,3 (No. 00-1823-A) (on file
with author).
211. See id. at 67, dep. ex. 3.
212. [d. at 78, 91-92. In fact, Parisi admitted that the netlearning.com domain
name had never generated any revenue for him, had never had any advertisers, and was never a subscription-based website. [d. at 78-79.
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time for thirty five dollars and a one-year term. 213 In April 1999, Parisi
registered netlearning.com a third time, again for thirty five dollars
and a one-year term. 214 In April 2000, Parisi registered netlearning.
com a fourth time, yet again for thirty five dollars and a one-year
term. 215 Finally, in April 2001, Parisi registered the netlearning.com
domain name a fifth time. 216
In April 1997, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) sent Parisi an office action letter denying his NetLearning
service mark application for a variety of reasons, including a likelihood of confusion with the existing registered mark LEARNNET.217
Parisi did not respond to the letter and, as a result, the USPTO classified the application as abandoned. 218
Around this same time, NetLearning, Inc., a Knoxville, Tennesseebased company that provides computer-based education products and
services to hospitals, medical groups, and other health care professionals, contacted Parisi regarding a possible purchase of Parisi's net
learning. com domain name. 219 NetLearning inquired because it did
business under the trade name NetLearning, Inc. and had begun to
acquire customers and market goodwill with respect to that trade
name. 220 NetLearning believed obtaining the domain name would be
fairly straightforward because "the domain name was not tied to any
web server ... and was not operating with an active web page."221
Unfortunately for NetLearning, this would end up being a time-consuming and litigation-fee-incurring mistake.
Mter several discussions between the parties, Parisi advised
NetLearning that he would not sell netlearning.com for less than
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

219.
220.
221.

See id. at 69, dep. ex. 4.
See id. at 69-70, dep. ex. 5.
See id. at 70, dep. ex. 6.
See id. at 70 (Parisi could not recall specifically renewing in 2001, but believes that he always renewed his registration when required to keep it
active).
See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
and Judgment on the Pleadings at 3, ex. F, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (on file
with author).
See id. at 3, ex. B (on file with author). Interestingly, in April 2000,
NetLearning filed a federal service mark application for a design that also
included the term "Netlearning" (appended with the slogan "The Ultimate
Learning System"). Id. at 4, ex. G (on file with author). Following a United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) letter initially denying its application, NetLearning made several modifications to its application, including disclaiming an exclusive use of the term "Netlearning" apart from
the mark as shown. Id. at 5, ex. K (on file with author). In light of these
changes, the USPTO approved NetLearning's service mark application and
registered it on the Principal Register (U.S. Registration No. 2487160). Id.
at 5, ex. G (On file with author).
See Declaration of John Morris at ~ 2, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (on file with
author).
Id.
[d.
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$25,000, despite the fact that this amount substantially exceeded Parisi's out-of-pocket expenses for the domain name, and netlearning.
com was passively held by Parisi with no active web server or active web
pages operating under that domain name. 222 When NetLearning refused to pay this price, Parisi connected the netlearning.com domain
name to an active server and re-directed that domain name to another
domain name that he had registered, whitehouse. com. 223 While it
222. [d. at "2-3. The first e-mail between the parties occurred on May 7, 1997,
when NetLearning's CEO John Morris wrote to Parisi: "I found your email
address through InterNIC and saw that you have netlearning.com registered. I also noted that you do not have a WEB server tied to that Domain.
Are you using the Domain? If you are or are not, please let me know.
Thank you." E-mail from John Morris, CEO, NetLearning, to Dan Parisi,
President, Infolook, Inc. (May 7, 1997, 16:45 EST) (on file with author).
On March 10, 1998, John Morris sent an e-mail to Parisi in which he offered "$500.00 for NetLearning and any associated trademarks, applications and domain names." E-mail fromJohnMorris.CEO.NetLearning.to
Dan Parisi, President, Infolook, Inc. (March 10, 1998, 13:27 EST) (on file
with author). NetLearning reiterated its desire to obtain this domain name
in e-mails to Parisi dated June 29, 1998 and October 13, 1999, ultimately
offering to pay Parisi $15,000 for the netlearning.com domain name. See Email from John Morris, CEO, NetLearning, to Dan Parisi, President, Infolook, Inc. (June 29, 1998, 15:19 EST); E-mail from John Morris, CEO,
NetLearning, to Dan Parisi, President, Infolook, Inc. (Oct. 13, 1999, 13:53
EST). On March 11,2000, Parisi wrote to John Morris indicating that he
would accept no less than $25,000 for the domain name. E-mail from Dan
Parisi, President, Infolook, Inc., to John Morris, CEO, NetLearning (March
11, 2000, 16:49:06 EST) (on file with author). There is no record of any
further e-mails between the parties following Parisi's March 11, 2000 e-mail.
223. Declaration of John Morris at 'l[ 3, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A). NetLearning has
not been the only party angered by Parisi's use of the whitehouse.com domain name. In fact, both the National Fruit Product Company and the
United States White House have requested that Parisi cease and desist his
operation of the whitehouse.com domain name as a clearinghouse for
adult content. The National Fruit Product Company demanded that Parisi
transfer rights in the whitehouse. com domain name to it based upon its use
of a "White House" labeled apple cider since 1913. See Charles Cooper,
Porn Site Squeezed fry Juice Maker, ZDNet News, at http://news.zdnet.com/
2100-9595_22-515555.html (Aug. 26, 1999) (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). The
National Fruit Product Company seemed especially concerned that their
"wholesome, family products" would be tarnished if somehow associated
with the whitehouse. com website content. [d.
Parisi's use of the whitehouse.com domain name also put him at odds
with the White House in late 1997, when an attorney for then-President Bill
Clinton sent Parisi a letter demanding that he cease and desist from his use
of the whitehouse.com domain name as part of a deceptive scheme to lure
internet users away from the website for the White House. See Letter from
Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to President Clinton, to Dan Parisi, President,
Infolook, Inc., available at http://news.com.com/2009-1023-207800.html?
legacy=cnet (Dec.8, 1997) (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
In addition to the whitehouse. com disputes, several organizations have
opposed Parisi for his registration of various "sucks. com" domain names,
including Netscape Communications. See, e.g., Netscapesucks.com Ordered to
Cease and Desist, at http://www.activewin.com/articles/netscape/article_l.
shtml (Dec. 1, 1998) (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). The current New York City
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might sound like the whitehouse. com web site was the online residence for the White House, in reality, it was an adult site, which contained numerous pornographic images and other pornographic
content. 224
Following Parisi's re-direction of the netlearning.com domain name
to whitehouse. com, several existing and potential customers and investors of NetLearning attempted to access NetLearning's web site by
entering the URL www.netlearning.com. 225 Upon entering this URL,
they were automatically re-directed to whitehouse. com and its pornographic content. 226
Several NetLearning customers testified that the re-direction confused them as to whether NetLearning was affiliated
with the whitehouse.com web site and its pornographic content. 227 For example, Wayne Wood, the technical administrator for St. Mary's Hospital, a major customer of
NetLearning, testified that when he typed in the URL net
learning. com "[t]he first picture that I [saw] was Hillary Clinton with black leather on. And then the second picture that
I [saw] was [P]resident Clinton and Ross Perot in a hot tub
with champagne with their shirts off."228
Mr. Wood was shocked and concerned that NetLearning was affiliated with this content. 229 As liaison for the NetLearning program at
St. Mary's Hospital, Wood further testified that he handled various
complaints from nurses and other employees who also were re-directed to pornographic images after typing in netlearning.com. 23o
Similarly, Dr. Charles Lutz, an investor in NetLearning whose employer was also a customer, sought information regarding NetLearning by entering the URL with NetLearning's trade name. 231 He, too,
was automatically re-directed to the whitehouse. com website that contained, among other content, doctored images of a former first lady
engaged in sexual conduct with a dog. 232 These images caused Dr.
Lutz concern about his continued investment in NetLearning and his

224.
225.
226.
227.

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Mayor, Michael Bloomberg, objected to michaelbloombergsucks.com. See
Amy Standen, The Saga of Sucks. com, at http://archive.salon.com/tech/fea
turej2001j06/25/sucksj (June 25, 2001) (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
Declaration of John Morris at ~ 4, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A).
[d. at ~ 5.
[d.
See Deposition of Wayne Wood at 7-12, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (on file with
author).
[d. at 8.
[d. at 10-11.
[d. at 12-14.
See Deposition of Charles Lutz, M.D. at 7, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (on file
with author).
[d. at 7-8.
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recommendation of NetLearning to his employer and other potential
customers. 233
Realizing that Parisi's conduct was starting to affect its customers
and investors, NetLearning filed a complaint under the UDRP against
Parisi on August 21, 2000. 234 Filed with the National Arbitration Forum, NetLearning alleged that Parisi had no interests or legitimate
rights in the netlearning.com domain name, and that he registered
and used it in bad faith.235
On September 12, 2000, Parisi denied all allegations and accused
NetLearning of reverse domain name hijacking. 236 Under the UDRPs
intended design as an expedient method for resolving disputes, Parisi's response might have been the final word before the UDRP panel
issued its decision. 237
However, the NAF's supplemental rules permitted an unlimited
number of "supplemental" pleadings as long as they were filed within
five calendar days of the respondent's response. 23B As a .result,
NetLearning filed a supplemental rebuttal statement on September
233. Id. at 8-11. Apparently, other clients and investors of NetLearning also encountered Parisi's re-direction of the netlearning.com domain name to the
whitehouse.com website. They were similarly confused "as to the location
of NetLearning, Inc.'s website and the type of information which NetLearning, Inc. may sponsor, endorse or be affiliated with." Affidavit of Walter
Cromer, NetLearning, Inc., v. Parisi, No. FA0008000095471 (Oct. 16,2000)
(Merhige, Johnson & Sorkin, Arbs.); Affidavit of Pamela Etheridge,
NetLearning, Inc. (No. FA0008000095471) (on file with author).
234. See NetLearning's Domain Name Dispute Complaint Format 7, NetLearning,
Inc. (No. FA0008000095471) (on file with author).
235. Id. at 5-10. This was hardly Parisi's first brush with litigation arising out of
his registration and use of domain names. Prior to the NetLearning matter, Parisi was involved in lawsuits with Dow Jones & Company, Inc. as well
as EDGAROnline, Inc. over his registration of certain domain names. In
the Dow Jones & Company matter, Dow Jones sued Parisi over his use of the
wallstreetjournal.com domain name that Dow Jones claimed violated its
rights in the registered trademark "The Wall StreetJournal." See Dow Jones
& Co., Inc. v. WSJ Inc., No. 97-7690, 1998 WL 2370, at **1 (2d Cir. Jan. 6,
1998).
Parisi was also sued by EDGAROnline, a company that, among other things,
compiles various corporate filings, who alleged that Parisi's registration of
the edgaronline.com infringed on its service mark rights. See Edgar Online,
Inc. v. Parisi, 4ILR (P & F) 8 (1999).
236. See Dan Parisi's Response in Accordance with the Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy, NetLearning, Inc. (No. FA0008000095471) (on
file with author).
237. See WIPO Final Report, supra note 1, at 49.
238. See The National Arbitration Furum's Supplemental Rules to ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (Effective on or before October 1, 2000) [hereinafter NAF's Supplemental Rules Pre-October 2000], R. 7, at http://www.arb
forum.com/domains/UDRP/rules_100100.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2005)
(this version of NAF's Supplemental Rules was in effect at the time of the
filing of these complaints).
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17, 2000,239 followed by a supplemental rebuttal response from Parisi
on September 22, 2000. 240 On September 26, 2000, the dispute experienced a flurry of filings with NetLearning submitting a third
pleading, styled NetLearning's Objection to Respondent's Petition for
Consideration,241 and Parisi submitted another pleading, this time
styled Dan Parisi's Reply to NetLearning, Inc.'s Objection to Respondent's Petition for Consideration. 242 All in all, both parties filed six
pleadings, totaling more than 100 pages in just over one monthhardly the markings of a dispute resolution procedure designed to
minimize legal costs. 243
On October 17, 2000, a three-member UDRP panel244 issued a 2-to1 decision in favor of NetLearning. 245 The majority found that Parisi
maintained no rights or legitimate interests in the netlearning.com
domain name and he registered and used it in bad faith.246 The panel
looked at both Parisi's actions and inactions in ruling against him:
The record reflects that the Respondent linked the domain
name to pornography sites or allowed the domain name to
sit dormant. The fact is that the Respondent has not used
the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of
goods and services, is not commonly known by the domain
239. See NetLearning Inc.'s Rebuttal Statement to Respondent's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy Response, NetLearning, Inc. (No.
FA0008000095471) (on file with author).
240. See Respondent's Reply to NetLearning, Inc.'s Rebuttal Statement to Respondent's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy Response,
NetLearning, Inc. (No. 00080000FA95471) (on file with author).
241. See NetLearning's Objection to Respondent's Petition for Consideration
(on file with author).
242. See Respondent's Reply to NetLearning, Inc.'s Objection to Respondent'S
Petition for Consideration, NetLearning, Inc. (No. 00080000FA95471) (on
file with author).
243. This is true even though the NAF charges parties $150.00 for each supplemental filing. See NAP's Supplemental Rules Pre-October 2000, supra note 241,
at R. 7.
244. Originally, NetLearning requested a single member panel. See NetLearning, Inc.'s Domain Name Dispute Complaint Form, NetLearning, Inc. (NO.
0008000095471) (on file with author). The NAF charged a fee of $750.00
for a single member panel. See NAP's Supplemental Rules Pre-October 2000,
supra note 241, R. 16. However, Parisi responded to NetLeaming's complaint by requesting a three-member panel. See Response in Accordance
With the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy at 10, NetLearning, Inc. (No. 0008000095471) (on file with author). This increased the fee
from $750.00 to $2,250.00. See NAP's Supplemental Rules Pre-October 2000,
supra note 241, R. 16.
245. See NetLearning, Inc., v. Parisi, No. FA0008000095471, pp. 5-6 (NAF Oct.
16,2000) (Merhige,johnson & Sorkin, Arbs.), available at http://www.arb
forum.com/ domains/ decisions/954 71.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2005) (on
file with author).
246. See id. at 4.
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name, and has not used the domain name
with a noncommercial purpose. 247

III

connection

The majority also concluded that Parisi registered and used the domain name in bad faith:
A reasonable conclusion is that Respondent either intended for commercial gain either directly from the references to adult entertainment and/or pornographic material
or as a bargaining tool in securing a higher price than had
been offered by Complainant for the domain name in issue.
However, it makes little difference as to Respondent's specific motive in his deliberate efforts-in any event it encompassed both embarrassment and harm to the Complainant.
At the very least, it entailed the registration and use of the
name in bad faith. 248
The panel ordered Parisi to transfer the netlearning.com domain
name to NetLearning, Inc. 249 The dissenting member of the panel,
David Sorkin, vigorously disagreed with the majority panel's decision,
going so far as to accuse NetLearning of engaging in bad faith
conduct. 25o
At this point, if the UDRP were truly an expedited domain name
dispute resolution mechanism, the UDRP panel's decision would be
binding, absent a finding of exceptional circumstances under which
the FAA permits an arbitrator's decision to be overturned. 251 However, this was not the case. The panel's decision was not the final
word. Soon after the decision, Parisi filed a declaratory relief complaint seeking to overturn the panel's order to transfer the domain
name to NetLearning. 252
Even the filing of this lawsuit was a curious event. Parisi filed his
original declaratory relief action on October 26, 2000 253-within the
ten-day deadline for filing a lawsuit to stay implementation of a UDRP
panel decision. 254 However, Parisi filed this lawsuit in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York.255 The
247. [d. at 4.
248. [d. at 5. While noting that Parisi claimed he never offered the netlearning.
com name for sale to any third party, the majority panel "reject[ed] the
accuracy" of that denial and, instead, found more persuasive the affidavit of
NetLearning's CFO, Jon Russell, that he had personally seen Parisi list the
netlearning.com domain name for sale on a third party website. [d. at 4.
249. [d. at 5.
250. [d. at 7 (Sorkin, Arb., dissenting).
251. See 9 U.S.C. § lO (2000).
252. See Original Parisi Declaratory Relief Complaint, Parisi v. NetLearning, Inc.,
139 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Va. 2001) (No.00-1823-A) (on file with author).
253. See id.
254. UDRP, supra note 2, § 4(k).
255. See Original Parisi Declaratory Relief Complaint, Parisi (No. 00-1832-A) (on
file with author).
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problem was that the UDRP allows a complainant to select the exclusive jurisdiction for actions arising out of the UDRP decision choosing
between the location of the domain name registrar or the domain
name registrant. 256 NetLearning selected the court jurisdiction where
the registrar (in this case Network Solutions, Inc.) was located, Northern Virginia. 257
As a result, Parisi had filed his action in the wrong court, thereby
failing to comply with Section K, which stays implementation of a
UDRP decision only when a lawsuit is filed in the proper jurisdictionwith "proper" defined as the jurisdiction selected by the complainant. 258 Apparently realizing his mistake, Parisi scurried to re-file the
lawsuit, on the same date, in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia. 259
Even still, the matter continued to meet with curious developments
in terms of wasted time and expense. For example, despite filing the
lawsuit on October 30, 2000, Parisi did not serve NetLearning with a
copy of the complaint until February 5, 2001. 260 This dilatory service
formed at least a partial basis for NetLearning's Motion to Dismiss
Parisi's complaint on the grounds that Parisi's complaint was an untimely motion to vacate an arbitrator's award (the UDRP panel's decision) under the FAA, which has a three-month deadline for filing
256. See Domain Name Dispute Complaint Form, NetLearning, Inc. v. Parisi, No.
FA0008000095471 (NAF Oct. 16, 2000) (Merhige, johnson & Sorkin,
Arbs.) (on file with author). The relevant portion of the complaint form
reads:
2. Complainant submits to court jurisdiction in (one of the following must be checked):
_ The location of the principal office of the Registrar
where the domain name was registered.
The location of the domain name holder's address as
shown for the registration of the domain name in Registrar's Whois database at the time the complaint was submitted to the Forum. Rule 3(b)(xiii)
Id.
257. Id. Parisi's counsel also apparently misunderstood UDRPRule 3(b) (xiii), as
his counsel transmitted a letter to the netlearning.com registrar with a copy
of the complaint filed in the Southern District of New York as well as instructions not to transfer the domain name to NetLearning "pursuant to
the relevant rules of the UDRP ... " despite the fact that the "relevant rules"
clearly called for the complaint to be filed in a court of competentjurisdiction located in Northern Virginia. See Letter from Ari Goldberger, Attorney
at Law, to Michaeljohnson, Business Affairs Office, Network Solutions, Inc.
(Oct. 26, 2000) (on file with author).
258. See UDRP, supra note 2, § 4(k); NetLearning's Domain Name Dispute Complaint Form, NetLeaming, Inc. (No. FA0008000095471) (NAF Oct. 16,2000)
(Merhige, johnson & Sorkin, Arbs.) (on file with author); Parisi's Original
Complaint, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (filed in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York).
259. See Second Parisi Declaratory Relief Complaint, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (on
file with author).
260. Parisi, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 748 & n.6.
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motions to vacate. 261 The district court held that a UDRPdecision was
not an arbitration decision subject to the FAA; therefore courts are
not subject to the FAA's deferential limitations. 262
Following the court's ruling, the parties proceeded to written and oral
discovery, including Rule 26 Disclosures, a Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting and Report to Court, interrogatories, requests for production, and
depositions of various witnesses and parties. 263 Finally, in April 2002,
nearly a year and a half after the October 2000 UDRP decision, the
case went to trial before Judge Leonie Brinkema. 264
During the dispute, one of Parisi's primary arguments was that he
could not have "registered" netlearning.com in "bad faith" because
NetLearning was not incorporated when Parisi first registered the domain name. 265 In response, NetLearning argued that, because a domain name registration expires after a set period of time, each time a
registrant renews its registration constitutes a new "registration,"266 so
subsequent renewals are subject to the UDRPs prohibition against
registering and using a domain name in bad faith. 267
This seemingly subtle point ultimately became very important because NetLearning argued that, while Parisi's original registration
might not have been made in bad faith, his subsequent re-registrations (and re-direction to the whitehouse. com website) were made
with the bad faith goal of disparaging NetLearning. 268
At the bench trial's conclusion, Judge Brinkema indicated that she
was inclined to agree with NetLearning's argument that subsequent
re-registrations could not be made in bad faith. 269 However, before
261. Id. at 749; 9 U.S.C. § 12 (2000).
262. Id. at 745-46, 753.
263. See, e.g., Deposition of Dan Parisi, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (on file with author); Deposition of Wayne Wood, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (on file with author); Plaintiff Dan Parisi's Objections and Responses to Defendant
NetLearning's First Interrogatories and Document Requests, Parisi (No. 001823-A) (on file with author).
264. See Telephone Interview with Tony R. Dalton, Counsel for NetLearning,
Woolf, McClane, Bright, Allen & Carpenter PLLC (Aug. 29, 2004). Interestingly, the court record reflects that counsel for the parties thought they
had settled this matter in October 2001. See NetLearning's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement at 2, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (on file with author). However, the record further reflects that Parisi refused to settle in
accordance with the terms his counsel had seemed to agree. Id.
265. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
and Judgment on the Pleadings at 1-2, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (on file with
author).
266. See NetLearning's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 9-10, Parisi,
(No. 00-1823-A) (on file with author).
267. Id. at 10.
268. Id. at 9-11.
269. See Telephone Interview with Tony R. Dalton, Counsel for NetLearning,
Wolf, McClane, Bright, Allen & Carpenter PLLC (Aug. 29, 2004) (on file
with author).
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she could rule, Parisi and NetLearning abruptly settled their dispute
and filed an Order of Dismissal on April 26, 2002. 270 While the terms
of the settlement were confidential, it is worth noting that NetLearning, Inc. is the current registrant for the netlearning.com domain
name. 271

B.

Lessons To Be Learned From Parisi v. NetLearning

Ultimately, the dispute between Parisi and NetLearning presents a
clear example of how the UDRP can fail its most basic goals of reducing litigation time and expenses. While hindsight is almost always filled with clearer vision, even a cursory review reveals that NetLearning
would have saved considerable time and expense if it had skipped the
UDRP process and proceeded straight to court.
In many respects, the UDRP did little more than delay NetLearning.
For example, although the UDRP seeks to reduce the amount of time
and money spent in a dispute, that simply was not the case, as evidenced by the more than 100 pages of pleadings filed in this supposedly expedited process.
What allowed for the filing of such a large amount of documents
(and, presumably, legal fees for preparing those documents) under a
mechanism designed to reduce filing and their attendant legal fees?
The answer is simple: the UDRPs decision to allow dispute resolution
providers to establish their own supplemental rules. Take for instance
the National Arbitration Forum's supplemental rules. The UDRP
gives each provider the autonomy to address technical and procedural
issues such as fees, word limits, and page limits. 272 In fact, the UDRPs
only limitation on supplemental rules is that they "shall not be inconsistent with the Policy."273
The NAF's rules provide that a complaint and a response shall not
exceed ten pages. 274 The parties may also "submit additional written
270. See Agreed Order of Compromise and Dismissal, Parisi (No. 00-1823-A) (on
file with author).
271. NetLeaming, Inc. v. Parisi, FA0008000095471, pp. 1,5 (NAF Oct. 16,2000)
(Merhige, Johnson & Sorkin, Arbs.), available at http://www.arb-forum.
com/domains/decisions/95471.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2005) (on file with
author).
272. See Rules, supra note 2, R 1.
273. Id.
274. See NAP's Supplemental Rules, supra note 209, ~~ 4-5. While the NAF has
amended its supplemental rules since the NetLeaming matter was filed in
2000, it has not changed the ten-page limits to complaints and responses.
See NAP's Supplemental Rules Pre-October 2000, supra note 241, ~~ 4-5. Even
with the ten-page limit, it is unclear from the NAF supplemental rules
whether exhibits or appendices are included within this limit or if the limit
only applies to the actual pleading. If it is the latter, then the NAF supplemental rules would appear to allow an unlimited number of exhibits and/
or appendices to a complaint or response so long as the pleading itself did
not exceed ten pages.
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statements and documents" in support of the complaint or response
within a five-day time period. 275 However, the NAF's supplemental
rules do not place any page or word limit on the additional written
statements nor, for that matter, do they limit the number of additional statements that parties may submit. 276 The result is that, under
the NAF's rules, parties cannot exceed ten pages in their initial filings,
but they are free to submit an unlimited number of pages of supplemen tal filings. 277
This obviously contradicts the UDRPs goal of providing an inexpensive dispute resolution mechanism because, while the rules provide
for an expedited time frame for resolving disputes,278 the rules do not
prevent parties from submitting hundreds of pages of supplemental
pleadings, likely expending thousands of additional dollars. That is
exactly what happened in the dispute between NetLearning, Inc. and
Parisi. 279
To avoid this, the UDRP could have simply limited the number of
pleadings each party could file as well as the number of pages for
these filings. Failing to do so allows for situations such as the Parisi
and NetLearning dispute where litigating a UDRP action simply adds
another layer of expense toward resolving a dispute. 28o
Another example of inefficiency from the NetLearning-Parisi dispute is the total lack of deference the federal trial court afforded the
UDRP panel's factual findings or legal conclusions. The Parisi court
specifically held that trial courts should review UDRP decisions de
novo, basing this conclusion in part on the fact that "the UDRP itself'
contemplates de novo review for UDRP decisions. 281 This essentially
eliminates the import of any legal conclusions or even factual findings
made by the UDRP panel. The UDRP decision becomes nothing more
than an extrajudicial viewpoint for a trial judge to potentially consider-with no more legal precedence than a journal or law review
article.
As participation in the UDRP is contract-driven and, therefore,
mandatory only for the domain name registrant, the UDRP cannot
force an unwilling complainant to seek relief under the UDRP.282
However, once a complainant decides to pursue a UDRP action, the
UDRP drafters could have easily constructed a process more like binding arbitration so that a panel decision, even if appealed in court,
would receive deference, and winning or losing a UDRP decision
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

See NAF's Supplemental Rules, supra note 209, § 7.
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would have at least some consequence. Instead, the UDRP is structured as a "mandatory administrative proceeding" that is meaningless
in court. 283
If NetLearning had anticipated Parisi's vigorous efforts to fight the
transfer of the netlearning.com domain name, it would have made
little sense for NetLearning to pursue a UDRP action. Going to court
would have been more efficient because NetLearning could have
saved the time and expense it incurred in litigating a UDRPaction that
ended up having no substantive or procedural legal value.
Ultimately, the dispute between NetLearning and Parisi over the
netlearning.com domain name provides a clear, real-world example of
the UDRPs problems. While some might respond that nobody can be
certain when a party will contest a UDRP action, this reasoning is
shortsighted. For matters in which negotiations have failed and parties have exchanged various demand-like letters (or sometimes both),
it does not require a crystal ball to predict the opposition's aggressive
stance. This outcome can be gleaned easily from the parties'
posturing.
In these cases, despite its intentions of providing timely and inexpensive resolutions to domain name disputes, the UDRP provides
neither because it allows for an unlimited number of supplemental
pleadings,284 yet provides no deference if appealed in court. 285 Instead, the dispute between NetLearning and Parisi demonstrates that,
in a contested case, the UDRPmay be nothing more than an expensive
prologue.

v.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The UDRP was conceived with noble goals: providing timely and inexpensive resolutions to domain name disputes for an industry where
timeliness is critical and the disputing parties are often individuals or
small companies that lack the resources to pursue or defend a fullblown lawsuit. 286 However, the UDRPs decision not to structure itself
as binding arbitration has led to a mechanism that denies parties any
real level of finality because U. S. courts have refused to afford UDRP
decisions deference. 287
The UDRP further suffers from the fact that individual dispute resolution providers may adopt supplemental rules that essentially allow
for unlimited pleadings. 288 As a result, prosecution or defense of a
UDRP action could indeed end up an expensive endeavor. Together,
these failures have resulted in a dispute resolution mechanism that, in
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contested matters, simply fails its intended purpose of quickly and
inexpensively resolving domain name disputes. This leads to a final,
important issue: Should the UDRP be revised to eliminate or reduce
these inefficiencies and, if so, how?
As to the first question, the answer is obviously yes. The concept of
providing fast and inexpensive dispute resolution should not be rejected out of hand-the need for quick resolution concerning Internet issues is paramount. Clearly, the UDRP is a very good idea.
Unfortunately, as the concept developed, it lost its fonn so that today,
for many domain name disputes, it can be more efficient to opt for a
court-administered resolution.
However, this does not have to be the case. Several structural
changes can be made to achieve the UDRPs goals. The final section
of this article outlines two proposals.
A.

Two Proposed UDRP Changes Designed to Enable the UDRP to Provide
Quicker and Less Expensive Resolutions in Contested Domain Name
Disputes

Because the underlying UDRP goals of reduced time and reduced
expense in resolving disputes are beneficial, the UDRP is certainly
worth trying to fix so that these goals can be realized in manY' contested cases. If implemented, the following two proposals would dramatically reduce the UDRPs existing inefficiencies providing these
goals:
1.

Restructure UDRP Proceedings as Binding Arbitrations Subject to
the Federal Arbitration Act

As discussed above, many nations have embraced binding arbitration as a viable and acceptable mechanism for resolving disputes. 289
Despite this, the UDRPdrafters decided against binding arbitration. 29o
However, the WIPO Final Report indicated that after time passed and
the UDRP developed, the structure should be reevaluated. 291 That
time is now.
Restructuring the UDRP as binding arbitration would provide its decisions with a deferential standard similar to the FAA.292 This would
give decisions more weight and reliability because the FAA allows
courts to overturn decisions only in narrow circumstances. 293 Complainants would be encouraged to pursue relief through the UDRP
because, if they prevail, the victory is not rendered useless simply by
filing a de novo court action. Similarly, the restructure should elimi289.
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nate the provisions that afford parties "Pre-Decision" and "Post-Decision" rights to avoid litigating a VDRP action. 294 Until these changes
occur, U.S. courts will continue to refuse to afford VDRP decisions
deference which, in turn, will prohibit the VDRP from obtaining the
level of finality necessary to convince complainants not to bypass the
VDRP and proceed straight to court.
2.

Eliminate or Dramatically Reduce the Number and Length of Permitted Supplemental Pleadings

In addition to binding arbitration, the VDRP can eliminate or dramatically reduce the number of supplemental pleadings allowed and
the length of those pleadings. This would help avoid a replay of the
Parisi v. NetLeaming, Inc. dispute. 295 The VDRPdoes not have to allow
an unlimited number of pleadings. Allowing for unlimited filings
leads to abuse and provides a tempting opportunity for participants to
try to get in the proverbial last word. This is a simple step and one
that the VDRP should take immediately to reign in inefficiencies resulting from unlimited supplemental filings.
In the end, the VDRPs current structure fails to serve its stated purpose-at least for contested domain name disputes. As demonstrated
by NetLeaming, Inc. v. Parisi, complainants who expect a VDRP action
to be contested are often better served in court because filing a VDRP
action will likely increase costs and delay resolution. 296 Whether the
VDRP truly becomes an efficient option will likely be determined by
whether it can reevaluate its approach and adopt more efficient provisions for all types of domain name disputes. Having passed its fiveyear anniversary, now is a prime time for such a reassessment.

294. See supra Part III.A.2.
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